What's signed. What's open. What we still mark unknown.
August's cooperation agreement is a . The September House vote (21–18) is a political yes. The contracts that lock the power are still ahead, and the Premier has not promised MHAs a vote on them.
Living board for the 17 August 2026 DCIA and the 17 September House endorsement. Material Terms are the drafting basis for Definitive Agreements targeted around 31 December 2026 (Art. 2.1); the instrument's Term runs to 31 March 2027 unless extended (§6.3). On 18 September the Premier said the deal returns to the House before definitive agreements but would not commit to a vote. Open People is not a DCIA party.
NL Hydro, Hydro-Québec, and CF(L)Co signed a cooperation paper in August. It is a framework for writing later contracts — not the contracts that lock the power.
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Hydro-Québec, and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited signed the Definitive Cooperation and Implementation Agreement dated as of 17 August 2026. Material Terms (Schedule B) are the drafting basis for Definitive Agreements. Those PPAs are not signed. Open People is not a party.
The House said yes 21–18 after a special sitting, with no referendum. That is a political yes. It does not write power-purchase contracts.
The House of Assembly endorsed the DCIA framework 21–18 just after 7 p.m. on 17 September 2026 (PC caucus of 20 plus Independent Eddie Joyce; 15 Liberals, 2 NDP, and Independent Keith Russell opposed; Russell left the PC caucus on 14 September). A referendum was cancelled beforehand — lead negotiator Barry Perry later described the caucus meeting where it was dropped (VOCM, 20 Sep). Reporting describes the vote as continuing toward a final agreement — not as execution of PPAs.
Public paper describes a new Churchill River plant in a range — not one locked size — and says studies still have to finish. First power is pencilled for the mid-2030s. Do not treat a press headline as a commissioned megawatt.
Schedule A §2 describes Gull Island as approximately 2,250 MW or 2,700 MW depending on final configuration (5 or 6 units), subject to technical and environmental studies. Schedule B §2(e): NLH’s GI volume interpolates on a straight line between 266 MW and 432 MW (example 2,475 MW → 349 MW). Annex B (2,700 MW case) shows first Gull volumes in 2036 (1,350 MW) and the full 2,700 MW from 2037; Canada.ca says “online target of 2036–2037”. That is a preliminary schedule, not a locked COD. The 2012 Lower Churchill federal review was on the order of 2,000 MW; IAAC confirmation that 2026 equals 2012 is not in the DCIA PDF.
The paper also talks about upgrading the existing Churchill Falls plant over time. The year-by-year megawatts in the annex are a joint preliminary picture — they move if the projects move.
CF Upgrades are a Development Project in the DCIA. Schedule A §1: 11 units, about +23.5% (approximately 1,275 MW), for a total rated capacity of approximately 6,703 MW. Annex B (17 Aug 2026) shows a preliminary ramp: 464 MW (2035), 580, 695, 811, 927, 1,043, 1,159 (2041), 1,275 MW from 2042. Approximate capacity figures and expected completion timelines are subject to detailed studies. CF Upgrades PPAs are described as availability / cost-plus, with NLH recapture on three-year notice. Not commissioned. Not a signed offtake for new Labrador industrial load.
The mining corridor from Churchill Falls to Labrador West is already tight. The August announcement attaches money to a new line. Engineering and permits are under way this fall. Nobody has published when it switches on.
NL Hydro’s Labrador West Transmission Expansion Study: existing 230 kV lines from Churchill Falls to Labrador West are at operational limits; Phase 1 selected a single 735 kV line with a maximum transfer of approximately 1,500 MW. As of September 2026 Hydro is in Front End Engineering Design (FEED) and pursuing permits for geotechnical work in summer/fall 2026, with FEED completion targeted for December 2026. Government of NL (17 Aug 2026) lists $1 billion (2026 NPV) in federal support for construction of the line as publicly described; the federal release itemises FEED and first/last-mile feasibility funding without that figure. Existing lines serving IOC / Tacora are the mining-first constraint. In-service date and cost: not published.
The Premier says the deal comes back to the House before the binding contracts are signed. He has not said MHAs will get a vote. The next decision point may have no vote attached.
On 18 September 2026 Premier Wakeham said the deal “will return to the House of Assembly prior to definitive agreements” but would not commit to a vote on them (NTV; VOCM). The Oversight Committee (Dan Levert, Julia Mullaley, Mike Jardine) stays on. Liberal leader Hogan called the absence of a further approval mechanism “discouraging”; NDP leader Dinn noted movement on PUB involvement. The NDP’s three unmet conditions (17 Sep): PUB-appointed oversight experts, a debate and vote on the final agreements, Innu approval. UNKNOWN: whether the definitive agreements will be voted on, or only tabled.
The parties say they want the real contracts around year-end. The framework clock can run into March 2027 unless they replace or extend it. While it runs, Hydro-Québec holds exclusive rights on Gull Island.
DCIA Article 2.1 sets the goal of entering into Definitive Agreements by 31 December 2026 and in any event by the end of the Term. Under §6.3(a) the Term ends on the earliest of execution of the Definitive Agreements, mutual termination, or 31 March 2027 (unless mutually extended in writing). §6.3(b) grants Hydro-Québec exclusivity on Gull Island during the Term. Until those PPAs exist, public retain megawatts are not a signed industrial queue.
The next public political gate is the Québec election. It is not an NL door you can walk through. The party that signed the paper is running third in the polls, and the front-runner has said it does not plan to tear the deal up — but it wants time to study it.
Québec’s 5 October 2026 provincial election (writs dropped 27 Aug) is the next public political gate for the Hydro-Québec / Government of Québec counterparty. Léger (21 Sep): PQ 29, PLQ 23, CAQ 20, PCQ 17, QS 10 — the CAQ, which signed, is third. Fréchette has said a final deal needs CAQ re-election; PSPP has said he has “no intention of tearing up” the agreement if it is good for Québec; all opposition parties want time to analyse; the PQ platform still seeks 1927-boundary compensation. Polls are context, not a gate. Outcome is UNKNOWN until the vote.
Innu Nation urged MHAs not to vote and says the paper cuts its benefits by more than half. The Premier said outstanding issues need to be resolved and that he looks forward to sitting down. Partnership remains open. As of 21 September the Grand Chief said the Innu are ready to meet, no meeting is scheduled, and it is always the Innu reaching out. Nothing large on that land proceeds without that work.
On 15 September 2026 Innu Nation, Sheshatshiu and Natuashish wrote asserting Churchill River waterway rights (VOCM). On 17 September Innu Nation wrote MHAs urging a no vote, delivered minutes before the vote, citing serious concerns over Gull Island payments; Grand Chief Jodie Ashini said benefits were cut “by over half” versus the 2024 MOU (CBC; Radio-Canada 18 Sep; no figures released). Premier Wakeham said outstanding issues need to be resolved and that he looks forward to sitting down. Partnership remains open — not a ratified Innu Nation partnership, royalty, or GI tariff path. VOCM (21 Sep): Ashini said Premier Wakeham has yet to contact the Innu Nation after the House vote — “it’s always us reaching out to him” — that the Innu are “ready and willing to meet”, and that they were never invited to the DCIA table. Independent MHA Keith Russell (Lake Melville) cited “ultimate disrespect” to the Innu in explaining his no vote. DCIA fundamental principles commit the parties to consulting Indigenous communities. Contact gap and partnership path: unresolved.
Innu communities on the Québec side say their consent is required too, and their older court case over Churchill Falls is still alive. That is a second Indigenous file on the same river.
Uashat mak Mani-utenam and Matimekush-Lac John have said their consent is mandatory for the Churchill Falls arrangements; their reparations case over the original development remains before the Québec courts (APTN). Distinct from Innu Nation (Labrador). No settlement or accommodation step tied to the DCIA has been published. UNKNOWN: how the Definitive Agreements treat this.
Export payments on the new paper move with a Canadian inflation band. Labrador industrial energy already splits a development block from a market block. Those are different machines. Do not mash them into one “cheap power” number.
DCIA Annex F: HQ target payments for existing CF adjust from a 2027 CPI base (Statistics Canada All-items, Canada) with a deadband centred on 2.06% ± 0.40% (1.66–2.46%), cumulative and reviewed annually from 2028. LAB-IND-1 (Jul 2026): firm energy is RFIRM = {(ED × RD) + (EM × RM)} / ETOTAL — Development and Market block rates are 2026 formula inputs, not a single industrial ¢/kWh. See /costs#contested: CP24 1.8¢ start (2027) vs 7.4¢ 50-year average — different measurements. Annex D $ → industrial ¢: UNKNOWN.
If NL does not use retained power at home, the paper already names ways Hydro-Québec can buy it — including a discounted default if there is no three-year notice. Leftover megawatts do not sit still by magic.
Schedule B §4(b)(iv): unplanned unused energy to serve domestic load may be sold to HQ at 95% of the applicable PPA price (Discounted PPA Price). HQ is obligated to purchase. Other HQ sale options (synthetic export up to 280 MW; CHPE-equivalent up to 240 MW; NECEC-equivalent up to 200 MW; 1.5× premium on CF entitlements) require at least three years’ prior notice. Recapture of volumes previously sold to HQ, for domestic load, is also on three-year notice. These are Material Terms for later PPAs — not executed offtake.
A large Labrador wind study sits in the paper. The company that would own it is not named. Do not invent a name, a dollar figure, or a federal share.
Schedule B §7: upon execution of the Definitive Agreements, NLH leads a feasibility study for a new 2,000 MW wind farm in NL (cost-plus 30-year PPA assumed; about eight years study-to-COD). If undertaken and completed, the Wind Project would be owned and operated by a new special-purpose entity held as NLH may determine in its sole discretion; HQ would be the majority off-taker with the balance to NLH. Annex B shows NLH wind at 400 MW from 2039. HQ pays GNL $400,000 per MW (about $640M on 1,600 MW) on completion of FEL 1–3, permits and PPA. SPE legal name: UNKNOWN. A ~$8B / 100% CPP-held “A” company: UNKNOWN — do not invent it. Federal equity percentage is not in the Material Terms we read.
The public still does not have a year-by-year meter of who gets retained power. A headline retain number is not a schedule.
Material Terms allocate capacity in Annex B and say NLH volumes are “first out of plant,” but a voter-checkable year-by-year metering and scheduling protocol for in-province industrial use is not published as a signed exhibit. UNKNOWN: public meter, queue, and industrial nomination rules.
The paper says retained power is for “domestic load” — and then lists ways leftover power can be sold west. What “used here” means in words a voter can check is still thin.
Schedule B §4: NLH’s CF, CF Upgrades, and GI capacity and energy entitlements “will only be used to serve its domestic load or as otherwise provided in this Section 4.” Section 4 then lists HQ purchase options. A contract definition of domestic / in-province load (mines, towns, other industry, compute) that a voter can check is not in the public Material Terms we read. UNKNOWN.